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[REDACTED] 30-74 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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24 JULY 1974

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C Y P R U S

USSR FOCUSES ON UN ACTION, CASTIGATES GREECE, "NATO CIRCLES"

Soviet reaction to the 15 July Cyprus coup ousting President Makarios and the ensuing crisis was highlighted by government statements on the 17th and 20th which, like other comment, focused on the need to restore Cyprus' independence and sovereignty and demanded the withdrawal of "all" Greek military personnel and the restoration of President Makarios' "legitimate government." Moscow has taken a cautious line on the Turkish armed intervention in Cyprus on the 20th, abstaining from any prior calls for restraint and avoiding either criticism or endorsement of the action.

Moscow expressed general approval of the UN Security Council resolution of the 20th, which among other things called for a cease-fire, but has shown irritation over Western preeminence in obtaining Turkish and Greek agreement for a cease-fire on the 22d. Moscow has reported but provided little comment on developments in the wake of the cease-fire agreement--the agreement on British-Greek-Turkish talks in Geneva, the transfer of the Cypriot presidency from Nikos Sampson to House of Representatives president Glavkos Kliridhis, and the Greek military junta's handing the reins over to a civilian government headed by former prime minister Karamanlis.

SOVIET GOVERNMENT, LEADER STATEMENTS

Following up the initial 15 July TASS statement on the coup in Cyprus, the Soviet Government statements of the 17th and 20th constituted a call to the United States and other Western powers to back strong Security Council action to remove "all" Greek military personnel from the island. The statement of the 17th, coming just before Makarios' departure from London to address the Security Council, seemed designed to support his appeal and reaffirm his position as head of the legitimate government. That the statement was addressed primarily to Washington was indicated by the assertion that no one could be deluded by Greece's attempts to conceal its involvement, "despite the fact that some people in the West caught up this false version"--an allusion to the State Department statement describing the coup as an internal Cypriot affair. Complaining about the position of "corresponding NATO countries" at the 16 July Security Council session, the statement echoed the Soviet UN delegate in calling on all states to demand cessation of foreign military intervention.

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and, as a "first measure," the immediate removal from Cyprus of "the entire Greek military personnel." The statement said that the position of the "corresponding NATO countries" at the council session showed that "certain NATO circles" planned the coup because of antipathy to Cyprus' independence and its non-aligned policy.

Further charges of NATO complicity with Greece in the coup as well as complaints about the stand of "some NATO members" were registered in the government statement of the 20th, which contained Moscow's first cautious official reaction to the landing of Turkish forces on Cyprus that morning. The statement noted that the situation in Cyprus had not changed for the better, but rather had become more dangerous and tense. It went on to charge Greece with continued "aggressive actions," dealing with the Turkish intervention in a later passage which merely cited Ankara as declaring the action was taken to protect the Turkish community and restore Cyprus' independence and its "legitimate government." Like the statement of the 17th, the second one urged removal of all Greek servicemen from the island and restoration of Cyprus' position as an independent and sovereign state. It repeated previous Soviet calls for an end to outside interference in Cyprus' internal affairs, allowing the Cypriot people to decide their destiny by themselves.

Brezhnev's brief remarks on Cyprus in his 21 July Warsaw speech at the Polish Sejm made no mention of Turkey's intervention, merely reiterating the theme that the events in Cyprus were a result of the Greek regime's "quite unconcealed armed aggression" and that "certain NATO circles" also bore responsibility. He called for an end to outside military interference and restoration of Cyprus' independence and sovereignty. Podgornyy likewise urged an end to outside interference and blamed the coup on the Greek military and "certain NATO circles backing them," in a speech on the 18th at a dinner for a visiting South Yemeni party-government delegation.

TASS DENIAL OF
SOVIET ALERT

Moscow ignored U.S. press reports on the 20th citing American officials as stating that the Soviet Union had put seven airborne divisions on alert. But a TASS "announcement" late on the 20th attributed to AFP a report that day that "a part" of the USSR's troops had "allegedly been alerted" in connection with the aggravation of tension in the eastern Mediterranean and that "the entire armed forces" of the USSR were alerted on the afternoon of the 20th. TASS cited AFP as reporting further that in response to this NATO

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forces in Europe had been alerted. TASS declared that it was "instructed by the competent organs" to state that the AFP report was an "utter fabrication" aimed at further aggravation of the situation "in the interests of certain aggressive circles," and concluded that the Soviet armed forces "remained in their usual state and have not been placed on alert." Followup to the TASS denial has been confined to TASS commentator Osipov's 22 July response to "fantasies" of British General Walker about an "alleged Moscow threat" in the Cyprus events, which Osipov dismissed as one of a series of fables, including AFP's "invention," emanating from "certain Western circles."

Soviet media played U.S. military movements in a low key. Reporting on the 19th on signs of increasing tension in the eastern Mediterranean, Moscow noted that the Greek and Turkish governments were holding urgent sessions and alerting their forces and that U.S. and British naval units were directed toward Cyprus. TASS on the 21st reported Secretary Kissinger's statement in San Clemente that he did not envisage U.S. interference in the Greek and Turkish military actions, nor did the United States intend to provide military assistance to Greece or Turkey. TASS quoted the Secretary as announcing that Washington had placed on alert an air division stationed in Europe and ordered the Sixth Fleet to sail for Cyprus "for the eventual evacuation of U.S. citizens from the island."

TURKISH INTERVENTION

Turkey's armed intervention has been handled in guarded fashion. Reportage prior to the Turkish landing on the 20th charged that the United States and Britain were concerned not with restraining the "putschists" in Cyprus but with preventing a Greek-Turkish conflict, and were pressuring Turkey to refrain from intervention. A one-sentence TASS dispatch on the 20th reported a State Department statement that the United States regretted Turkey's military action just as it deplored the previous action of Greece which precipitated the crisis. TASS reported that the Turkish ambassador, at his request, had met with Gromyko on the 20th and the 21st; at the first meeting they "discussed the events in Cyprus" and at the second they "continued the exchange of opinions" on the Cyprus situation. Minimal references to the Turkish military action in Soviet comment have tended to deflect attention from Ankara's intervention; an Arabic-language commentary on the 22d, for example, blamed Greece for disregarding the possibility that its military intervention would prompt "grave" reaction from Turkey.

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Soviet calls for an end to foreign military interference have been aimed at Greece, with Moscow straightforwardly reporting Turkey's explanations of intervention as aimed at protecting the Turkish Cypriot population and restoring the "status quo." But Moscow may have some doubt as to Turkey's ultimate intentions: In reporting Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's 22 July press conference, TASS ignored his statement that Turkey's presence in Cyprus was "irrevocably established" and that this situation created "new possibilities" for finding solutions to the Cyprus question. Nor has Moscow picked up remarks by other Turkish officials on the 23d envisioning some form of a federal system for Cyprus. Moscow has been insistent in calling for the independence and "territorial integrity" of Cyprus, and comment last spring had expressed disapproval of a Turkish-advocated "federal" solution as amounting to partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. Current comment has repeated Moscow's long-standing opposition to enosis, viewing the coup in Cyprus as a step toward this Greek goal. TASS on the 24th reported that Makarios, commenting in his New York press conference on "Western press reports" of plans by "certain circles" for a possible division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, called such an approach "absolutely unacceptable." TASS quoted him as saying that "no decision taken at the Geneva talks will be valid unless it has my approval."

Reportage on the fighting in Cyprus left the local population largely out of the picture, conveying an impression of Turkish forces battling Greek forces and the "rebel units" of the National Guard. TASS reports on the 23d noted some skirmishing after the cease-fire by unidentified combatants in the area of the airport and along the "Green Line" separating Greek and Turkish communities in Nicosia. TASS cited foreign correspondents in Kyrenia as reporting that Turkish troops and National Guard units had not violated the cease-fire.

WESTERN ROLE IN
CEASE-FIRE

The government statements urging Security Council action on Cyprus conveyed implicit criticism of the United States, as well as other Western powers, over the timing and content of a council resolution on Cyprus. The resolution adopted on the 20th was one Moscow could live with: TASS reported Soviet UN delegate Safronchuk as expressing satisfaction that it answered two main demands--supporting the legitimate government of Cyprus and ending "foreign military interference"--despite the fact that "not all of its provisions suit the present situation." (A foreign-language commentary by Zholkver on the 22d expressed hope that, "although

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not all of the resolution is in tune with the time," it would help restore the constitution in Cyprus.) TASS noted that the resolution called on all sides to cease fire as a first step and appealed to Greece, Turkey and Britain to start negotiations for the restoration of peace and constitutional government in Cyprus.

But Moscow was clearly miffed by the success of Washington's diplomacy, in collaboration with West European allies, in achieving agreement on a cease-fire. Prior to the Turkish intervention, Soviet reportage on the 19th had noted Undersecretary of State Sisco's talks in London and Athens, but his subsequent shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara apparently went unreported. TASS on the 22d promptly reported first British then U.S. announcements that a cease-fire would be effected as of 1400 GMT that day, following up with reports that Turkey and Greece accepted the Security Council's call for a cease-fire. TASS later noted that the "rebel-controlled" Nicosia radio had broadcast a cease-fire order to National Guard units.

On the 23d Moscow began to display its pique; TASS commentator Kornilov complained that "certain Western powers" which tried to prevent the Security Council from taking action to restore peace were now posing as peacemakers and taking credit for first steps toward progress, while ignoring Soviet "diplomatic demarches" for council action and misrepresenting Moscow's position. Along the same lines, TASS director general Zamyatin, in a SOVIET RUSSIA article the same day, similarly accused "certain states" of trying at first to paralyze Security Council action in support of the lawful Cypriot government, and of later trying to "rush through only a cease-fire resolution," using the landing of Turkish troops as a "pretext," while leaving aside the need for withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus and restoration of constitutional rule in the country.

Reports of Secretary Kissinger's 22 July press conference reflected irritation in observing that he "did not say a word" about the Security Council role in working out a resolution. TASS remarked on the 23d that Kissinger "limited himself" to describing U.S. efforts "within the NATO framework" since "the problem concerns NATO" and the United States must act in close cooperation with its allies. TASS noted that in response to questions, Kissinger said that restoration of "constitutional order" would be a subject of the Geneva talks under Britain's aegis. On the matter of withdrawal of Greek officers, TASS reported him as saying that this problem must be solved in Geneva since "it had one meaning last

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week and can have an absolutely different meaning in some other context" now that there are big Turkish forces on the island and the situation is "somewhat different" from what it was last week.

Singling out London press criticism of British actions, TASS on the 23d claimed that such "frank admissions" exposed the contentions of some Western political and press circles that "possible progress" toward a settlement was "allegedly the result of efforts by some Western powers." And TASS cited the DAILY MAIL as saying that while "some people" in the United States were trying to credit Kissinger with reaching a cease-fire, such an evaluation "is at variance with the actual state of things."

CHANGE OF CYPRIOT,
GREEK REGIMES

Moscow has reported but not yet commented on the 23 July transfer of the Cypriot presidency from Nikos Sampson to House of Representatives president Glavkos Kliridhis and the replacement of the Greek military regime with a civilian government headed by former prime minister Karamanlis. TASS reported that "President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios," at a New York press conference, welcomed Kliridhis as "provisional president" who would be "carrying out presidential duties until my return."

TASS also reported Makarios as expressing hope that the restoration of civilian rule in Greek would have a favorable effect on the Cyprus situation. In the first comment on the Greek changeover, a Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 24th declared that the fall of the Athens military government was the first consequence of the Cyprus crisis and followed the failure of the "junta's armed interference" in Cyprus' internal affairs. The radio noted that the news of the army's handover of power to a civilian government had been greeted with "great satisfaction" in Athens. On the other hand, some reservations about the political character of the new regime seemed reflected in the TASS report of the announcement of the government's resignation: TASS noted that this had been preceded by a conference of cabinet members, high-ranking military, and "leaders of the bourgeois opposition parties."

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EAST EUROPE, PEKING CAUTIOUS ON POST-COUP DEVELOPMENTS

All the East European countries, in official statements and comment, denounced the 15 July coup in Cyprus and demanded restoration of the Makarios government. Reaction to the Turkish military intervention has been mixed, ranging from factual reports through various degrees of disapproval. The small volume of comment on the cease-fire, as well as the timing of the respective government statements,* reflected caution and general uncertainty over the course of Cyprus developments. In the only monitored Albanian comment, the party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on the 24th typically placed sole blame for the crisis on the United States and the Soviet Union.

There has been little reaction so far from East European media to the governmental changes in Cyprus and Greece on the 23d. An initial response from Hungary, a Budapest domestic service commentary on the 23d, viewed the changes in Nicosia and Athens as triggered by expediency in an effort to retrieve something from the Cyprus coup, which had "failed." While conceding that Glavkos Kliridhis had been held in public esteem prior to the coup, the radio charged that "this does not alter the fact that his appointment as head of state is just as illegal as Sampson's was," adding that the changes in both Athens and Nicosia leave things "essentially the same."

TURKISH INTERVENTION While East European reaction to the Turkish intervention has been varied, some comment has gone far beyond Moscow's cautious factual approach to voice disapproval and express doubts about Ankara's motivation. The more guarded reactions came from Bulgaria and Poland: Sofia radio merely reported factually on the intervention, and Warsaw's response has been mild, in keeping with its usual restrained stance on developments in the Middle East. Speaking at a Polish anniversary meeting in Warsaw on the 21st, PZPR First Secretary Gierek noted only that the Greek-instigated coup in Cyprus "has triggered action on the part of Turkey." An East Berlin domestic service commentary on the 20th portrayed it as a regrettable development that could have been averted if the United States and Britain had not "blocked the voting" on the Security Council resolution on the 19th.

* Government statements were issued by Yugoslavia on the 15th, Bulgaria, East Germany and Hungary on the 18th, Poland on the 19th, Romania on the 20th and Czechoslovakia on the 22d.

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The Czechoslovak Government on the 22d said Prague "expects" that immediately following the end of the Greek intervention "the withdrawal of the armed forces of the Turkish Republic from Cyprus will also be effected." Stronger criticism of the Turkish action had come in a Prague domestic service commentary on the 20th which derided Ankara's justification of its intervention as aimed at protecting the Turkish community and restoring Cyprus' independence. The radio charged that "both are pretexts for establishing indisputable claim to the disputed oil fields stretching from Cyprus to Crete."

A Budapest radio commentary early on the 21st charged that the Turkish action was motivated "not by the defense of justice and legitimate order but the unfounded fear that Greece will annex Cyprus." In harsher terms, another commentary later the same day ridiculed Ankara's alleged pose as "the protector of law and order," pointing out that the Turkish Cypriots were not threatened with any immediate danger and that Archbishop Makarios had condemned the invasion. The radio added that the action represented a NATO "miscalculation," possibly leading ultimately to intervention by the "leading" NATO powers.

The Romanian Government in a prompt government statement broadcast by Bucharest radio on the 20th, while condemning the coup and emphasizing support for Makarios, "at the same time" expressed "deep anxiety" over Turkey's "military actions." The government statement called for the immediate cessation of "all military acts of any state on Cypriot territory" and for the immediate withdrawal of "foreign troops" as well as for the restoration of the "legal government led by President Makarios."

Yugoslavia provided the heaviest comment on Turkey's role. While initial reaction suggested toleration, Belgrade subsequently displayed growing concern over Turkey's motives. On 21 July Zagreb radio commentator Ante Kesic described the invasion as "a military counter-intervention . . . a foreign intervention to a foreign intervention needed in order to move the Security Council" to act on the crisis.

The first official Yugoslav comment indicated that Belgrade had strong reservations about Turkey's military presence on Cyprus. Foreign Minister Minic on the 23d, according to TANJUG, informed the Federal Assembly that the government had "officially" expressed its concern to the Turkish Government. Pointing out that Yugoslavia could understand Turkey's justification for "military reaction," Minic said Yugoslavia expected that the "actual aim" of the Turks

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was limited to full restoration of the pre-coup situation. Any other aims, Minic said, would deepen the crisis, "creating a new danger to peace and security."

Elaborating on these official concerns, Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic on the 23d noted that the Turkish representative had said he would speak on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots at the Geneva talks. Sundic saw this as the first clear indication that "Turkey, too, is questioning Cyprus' sovereignty." He viewed the representative's statement as an indication that Turkey had revised its original attitude and expressed fear that Ankara was "inclined toward a possible division of the island into a Greek and a Turkish section." Sundic predicted that negotiations would be very difficult and their possible failure could have "far graver consequences" than the coup itself.

PEKING In a belated response to events in Cyprus, Peking has voiced support for President Makarios while avoiding direct criticism of Greece and Turkey. The Chinese did not take note of the 15 July coup until a 19 July NCNA report said that "President Makarios" had been overthrown by the Cypriot National Guard and had safely left the country after calling for continued popular resistance against the "rebels." NCNA on the 19th also replayed Makarios' charges at the UN Security Council meeting that day of Athens' role in support of the coup, and it noted on the 20th that Turkey had sent troops to Cyprus and fighting was going on there.

Chinese UN representative Chuang Yen, explaining Peking's support for the UN Security Council cease-fire resolution on 20 July, firmly backed the struggle of the Cypriot people under the leadership of "President Archbishop Makarios, the legitimate head of state of Cyprus" and opposed aggression and subversion there by "all foreign forces." Chuang pointed up Chinese concern over alleged superpower intentions to exploit the present troubled situation in order to expand their competing interests in the area.

A terse 22 July NCNA report noted that Greece and Turkey had agreed that day to a cease-fire. NCNA on the 24th carried factual reports on the transfer of the Cypriot presidency from Nikos Sampson to Glavkos Kliridhis, as well as the resignation of the Greek military government and the swearing in of Karamanlis as head of a civilian government.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

BREZHNEV JOINS DETENTE-DEFENSE DEBATE, CITES SUMMIT RESULTS

In his 21 June Warsaw speech to the Polish Sejm, Brezhnev joined earlier spokesmen in the internal Soviet detente-defense debate who have warned against relying on military might alone as a guarantee of Soviet security. In doing so he strongly defended the fruitfulness of the June Moscow summit and gave his most forthright defense of Soviet arms control diplomacy since before the Middle East fighting last fall.

DETENTE-DEFENSE DEBATE

Brezhnev took direct issue with the notion, said to have been dominant "for centuries," that a nation's security is best guaranteed by the formula: "If you want peace, be ready for war." In warning against the practical consequences of that formula, Brezhnev resorted to arguments that have long been used by Soviet moderates to urge restraint in military programs:

In our nuclear age this formula conceals particular danger. Man dies only once. However, in recent years such a mass of weapons has already been stockpiled to make it possible to destroy every living thing on earth several times.

Brezhnev went on to assert that the best way to insure peace was instead to "conduct a policy of peace and to fight for that policy."

Hardline spokesmen have countered that such arguments overemphasize the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy and have rejected the notion that the Soviet side would suffer as much as an opponent in the event of a nuclear exchange. Rear Admiral V.V. Shelyag--a member of the editorial board of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES and deputy head of a sector in the Lenin Military-Political Academy--presented the opposing viewpoint in RED STAR last February, amid increasing signs that these issues were again under debate in Moscow under the impact of detente:

Oversimplified arguments about the death of civilization and about there being no victors in a nuclear war are based on mathematical calculations. The authors of these arguments divide the quantity of the stockpiled nuclear potential in the world by the number of people living on earth. As a result it

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emerges that all mankind really could be destroyed. This is an oversimplified, one-sided approach to such a complex sociohistorical phenomenon as war.

Shelyag went on to defend the Soviet Union's acquisition of "modern weapons" on the grounds that in the event of a world war they would be a means not of destroying mankind but of "routing the aggressor and consequently defending civilization."*

Brezhnev's remarks on overkill are his second public statement on this theme in recent weeks. In his 14 June Supreme Soviet election speech he responded to those who argued that limiting arms was risky by saying that "it is an immensely greater risk to continue to accumulate weapons without restraint." USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov warmly endorsed that argument in a 13 July IZVESTIYA article.

In the late 1960's Brezhnev was an outspoken public supporter of the rapid Soviet strategic buildup. As the chief spokesman for Soviet diplomacy in recent years, he has edged toward the center on these issues and has expressed solid support for specific Soviet arms control initiatives. Nevertheless, he had continued to avoid the more outspoken arguments for restraint on strategic arms characteristic of moderates such as Arbatov and Aleksandr Bovin, now an IZVESTIYA observer. Brezhnev now seems to be moving toward a more forthright espousal of the soft line position, perhaps in response to the evolution of debate on these issues in Moscow.

His remarks came in the wake of RED STAR's reaffirmation in its 9 July editorial on the recent summit that "in increasing the power and might of the Soviet Union, we are thereby strengthening the foundations of a stable peace on earth." This linkage between Soviet power and peace was also made in May and June by Defense Minister Grechko and Main Political Directorate head Yepishev. Both referred to a remark by Lenin that stressed the indivisibility of strengthening international security and strengthening Soviet defenses. According to Yepishev, in KOMMUNIST No. 7, Lenin said that "our steps toward peace must be accompanied by enhancement of our military preparedness."

SUMMIT AGREEMENTS Elsewhere in his Warsaw speech, Brezhnev sought to put the best possible face on the summit's arms control accomplishments. Reciting the list of agreements signed in Moscow, he elaborated on the terse language of the treaty limiting

* Shelyag's article, an extreme statement of the military position, is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 February 1974, pages 6-8.

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underground nuclear tests, stating that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to "reduce considerably" the number of underground tests. The treaty itself said that, below the threshold of 150 kilotons, the two countries agreed to limit tests "to a minimum." Despite this bold front, Brezhnev seemed defensive about the summit's arms control progress. Returning to a theme he first broached at the dinner hosted by President Nixon in Moscow on 2 July, he asserted that although the Soviet Union was pleased with the summit "we would like still more and would be willing to agree to more" arms agreements.

Becoming specific, he averred Soviet willingness to agree to a total ban on underground tests and he renewed a long-standing Soviet proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union should withdraw their nuclear-equipped naval forces from the Mediterranean. That proposal had first been made in a 20 May 1963 note to the United States in response to the initial deployment of U.S. nuclear missile submarines to the area. Continued Soviet support for a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone had been voiced as late as 1969 by President Podgorny. After 1969 Soviet public statements on the issue became muted as it got involved in the SALT negotiations.

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USSR - POLAND

BREZHNEV, GIEREK PRAISE TIES, ENDORSE WORLD "CONFERENCES"

The 19-22 July Brezhnev visit to Warsaw for the 30th anniversary of communist Poland provided the occasion for personal praise of the Soviet leader and affirmations of the benefits afforded Poland by its alliance with the USSR and other communist countries. The two leaders also expressed low-keyed endorsements of another world party conference, with Brezhnev going on record for the first time with an authoritative call for a preliminary conference of European communist parties.

Brezhnev clearly played the starring role at the festivities--he was the only foreign party leader in attendance, other socialist countries being represented by lower-level figures. At the 20th and 25th Polish anniversaries, top-ranking East German and Czechoslovak leaders had also attended, in addition to Khrushchev in 1964 and Brezhnev in 1969. This year, a friendship rally at Katowice--Gierek's home base--was addressed only by Brezhnev, without the customary response by the host country's party leader. Brezhnev's role was further underscored this time by the award to him of Poland's highest military decoration. As is customary, the anniversary festivities culminated with a military parade, on the 22d, featuring an address by Defense Minister Jaruzelski.

BREZHNEV SPEECHES As on previous bilateral occasions, Brezhnev was moderate in his praise of Gierek's leadership of Poland's socialist construction, beset with such continuing problems as slow progress in collectivization of agriculture and public pressure for an improved living standard. At the Katowice rally, where he was introduced by provincial party first secretary Grudzien, the Soviet leader included a single standard passage of praise for Gierek, who was on the platform, in the context of praise for the PZPR Central Committee: "The Central Committee of your party and its First Secretary, that remarkable son of the Polish working class, the son of your glorious region, that outstanding Marxist-Leninist, Comrade Edward Gierek, enjoy a high level of esteem in our country, as they do in Poland." Brezhnev emphasized the close political, military, and economic ties between the two countries. In addition to mentioning integration under CEMA, he pointed to Soviet use of ships built in Poland, the large volume of Soviet petroleum refined at Plock, and the contribution of Soviet specialists to the building of the Nowa Huta Metallurgical Combine.

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In his speech before the Polish Sejm on the 21st, Brezhnev's references to the Polish leader were confined to passing allusions to points Gierek had made in his preceding speech. The Soviet leader also referred to "difficulties" faced by the Polish party in carrying out the program adopted at its 1971 congress, indicating as well that the Soviet-Polish relationship had its difficult side. Thus he noted that overcoming Poland's "specific" problems in socialist building "is a difficult undertaking and will require a straining of the creative forces of the people," as well as "discipline." He went on to declare that the USSR's policy was to "find mutually advantageous solutions to the diverse and at times difficult problems" that face the two countries.

GIEREK SPEECHES In a ceremony preceding his main address at the Sejm, Gierek lavishly praised Brezhnev for his role in Poland's liberation in awarding him the Great Cross of the Virtuti Military Order. The award speech paid tribute to Brezhnev as leader of the Soviet Union, "our closest friend, our steadfast ally, and our most important partner in the fields of social, economic, and cultural cooperation." Gierek went on to hail Brezhnev's "indefatigable activity in the international arena" in implementing the peace program of the 24th CPSU Congress.

In his main speech, Gierek delivered a lengthy, positive review of his stewardship since taking over from Gomulka in December 1970, stressing price stabilization, housing, and public health. At the same time Gierek underscored the country's social stresses in declaring that the regime's concern for the welfare of the individual must be matched by "every citizen's ability to make proper use of his rights" and "a high degree of discipline." He added that fulfillment of Poland's plans depended on its membership in the socialist community and that "the fundamental prerequisite of the position of our country in the world is the class and national alliance with the Soviet Union."

COMMUNIST RELATIONS In his Katowice rally speech Brezhnev noted that "many communist and workers parties are posing the question now about the necessity for preparing and holding new international meetings," adding that the CPSU "agrees with this" and believes the time has come for "such meetings." He added, in the first explicit Soviet endorsement of the idea, that "we think the holding of a new conference of European communist parties could help to strengthen joint actions" on the continent.

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In his Sejm address the next day, Gierek took a position similar to Brezhnev's, observing that "the further consolidation of the international communist movement" is "well served by international conferences of communist parties." At a rally in honor of the GDR's Honecker on 8 June, Gierek had declared flatly that a majority of world communist parties back a new world conference. He had also on that occasion, though not in his 21 July Sejm speech, registered explicit support for a European communist party conference.

Atypically, there was no criticism of Peking by the two leaders during the visit. Brezhnev in his Sejm speech confined himself to stressing the alertness of the CPSU and PZPR to the need for ideological unity in the struggle against "any deviation from Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism." The PRC and Albania were omitted by Gierek in his enumeration of "fraternal" socialist countries with which Poland has active bilateral relations. At the same time, however, P.R. on 22 July did include these two countries in a listing of those sending congratulatory messages to Poland on its 30th anniversary.

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MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN WARN BONN ON WEST BERLIN OFFICE

Recent Soviet and GDR condemnation of FRG plans to establish the Federal Environmental Agency (FEA) in West Berlin have been raised to the official level in obviously coordinated protests from Moscow and East Berlin that this would be a violation of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement, released by TASS on 19 July, said vaguely that "appropriate measures" would be taken regarding the transit routes between the FRG and West Berlin if Bonn established the agency there. But a GDR Government statement released the next day specified that under these measures the use of the routes for the transit of FEA personnel, property, or documents would be prohibited.

USSR STATEMENT The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement, Moscow's first such public protest regarding West Berlin and the FRG since the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, charged that the FEA would "run counter" to the agreement and be "at variance" with and "in defiance" of it, noting that establishment of the FEA would "unilaterally" change the status quo. The statement warned that if the FEA is in fact set up, the Soviet side would proceed from "an understanding" that "there will arise a necessity to take appropriate measures to counteract attempts at violating the four-power agreement and to protect the legitimate interests" of the Soviet Union and the GDR. It added that "responsibility for the consequences of violation" of the agreement would rest with the "initiators" behind establishing the FEA in West Berlin. The most recent Moscow press article on the FEA, a 7 July IZVESTIYA commentary by G. Sidorov strongly denouncing the Bundestag's actions on FEA, had warned that by "contravening the four-power agreement," those responsible in Bonn would be rendering a "disservice" to the West Berlin people.

The 7 July IZVESTIYA article had made one of the strongest criticisms of the new Bonn government since Brandt's resignation in charging that "certain circles of the ruling FRG coalition" sought "to undermine" the four-power agreement with the establishment of the FEA. In contrast, the Soviet statement, instead of attacking the SPD-FDP coalition, sought to explain that the Bundestag decision on the FEA was made "under the pressure of the CDU/CSU as well as with the active assistance of the West Berlin Senat," ignoring the fact that the Bundestag decision was unanimously approved on 19 June.

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Brezhnev in his Warsaw speech on the 21st said nothing about the Berlin situation, and as regards the FRG limited himself to expressing "satisfaction" that Chancellor Schmidt had "confirmed" his "firm intention" to preserve and augment that which was done by his "far-seeing predecessors."

GDR STATEMENT While the Soviet statement did not spell out what counteractions would be taken against Bonn, the GDR Government statement was more specific. After repeating the standard GDR argumentation regarding the FEA of recent weeks, the statement said that as soon as the FEA legislation is "effectively" implemented, the GDR, "taking care of its legitimate interests and with a view to insuring the observance of the four-power agreement, will be compelled to take the appropriate measures," defined as follows:

The transit of staff of this FRG Federal office and the conveyance of the relevant property and the relevant documentation over the communication [routes] will be regarded as unlawful. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for transit travel by representatives of this federal authority.

Echoing the Soviet statement, the GDR statement declared that it had "repeatedly and duly warned" the FRG and that the latter "bears the full responsibility for the consequences of this violation" of the four-power agreement. GDR Council of Ministers Chairman Sindermann repeated the East Berlin warning in a speech on the 22d.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, in an article on the 13th which forewarned that establishment of the FEA in West Berlin would "have its consequences," as well as other recent East Berlin commentaries have made it clear that the GDR would work to abort the usefulness of the FEA's work in West Berlin, hinting that the East European states may not cooperate with the agency in solving environmental problems in central and northern Europe.

**MOSCOW ON DURATION OF
FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT**

In a unique commentary first broadcast by Moscow radio in its German service on 18 July, observer Valentin Zakharov, a specialist on German affairs, discussed the duration of the Quadripartite Agreement on "West Berlin." While reviewing many established Moscow points on the FEA question, Zakharov noted specifically and repeatedly that although the agreement has been in effect for more

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than two years, the agreement "has no specific maturity." He argued that "realistic" persons could only realize that "there are indeed alternatives to the policy of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin for the socialist states, but no alternatives to this agreement for Bonn's foreign policy."

This radio commentary could be read as part of Moscow's psychological and political pressures on Bonn over the FEA question, but this is the first known reference in the Moscow media implicitly questioning the four-power agreement and even hinting at a terminal time period for the agreement. As a rule, Moscow radio's German commentaries are finely tuned to issues regarding East-West German affairs, and commentators reviewing such issues as the agreement on Berlin are extremely careful in their discussions. This Zakharov commentary may represent only an atypical lapse of attention to detail by its author, but at a minimum it is a curious signal at a critical time.

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INDOCHINA

DRV MEDIA PLAY DOWN 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS

At sharp variance with the fanfare normally accorded decennial and quinquennial anniversaries, Hanoi media's attention to the 20 July anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina was at a lower level and more limited even than that given the 19th anniversary last year. Although attention last year--the first anniversary after the January 1973 Paris agreements--was somewhat less than in previous routine years, there was at least an anniversary editorial in the party paper NHAN DAN. This year NHAN DAN marked the anniversary only with an unsigned article, and the editorial that day dealt with hog raising. Hanoi radio's press review for the 20th described the editorial in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as being on the anniversary, but available broadcast versions referred to the military campaigns in 1954 but did not mention the Geneva agreement.

Hanoi's attention to the 10th anniversary in 1964 extended over several days and included nationwide meetings as well as a rally in Hanoi, visits to the DRV by foreign delegations, a DRV Government statement, instructions from the Vietnam Workers Party Secretariat, a note to the Geneva conference cochairmen, a Foreign Ministry White Book, and a Ho Chi Minh interview. The 15th anniversary in 1969 prompted a Ho Chi Minh appeal, a foreign ministry memorandum and a "grand meeting" attended by high-level DRV leaders, as well as the traditional editorial comment. From 1970 through 1972 the anniversary invariably drew a memorandum from the DRV Foreign Ministry and editorials in the press, and in 1972 President Ton Duc Thang issued an appeal on the occasion.

The 20 July NHAN DAN article on the Geneva agreements anniversary presented a standard Hanoi view of the situation in Vietnam, accusing the United States of violating both the Geneva and the Paris agreements. The 1973 anniversary editorial in NHAN DAN had similarly denounced alleged U.S. violations of the Geneva and Paris agreements, but it seemed less pessimistic than this year's article--balancing references to difficulties confronting the revolution with claims of "brilliant prospects" and "enthusiasm in the future." The current anniversary article, like other recent comment, shows concern about what it calls Washington's attempts to pursue a neocolonialist policy. And it sees these attempts in the support of Saigon's military forces, the U.S. presence in Thailand, and U.S. relationships with the USSR and China.

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This year's 20 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial dealt mainly with the situation in South Vietnam and, as reported by Hanoi radio, it made no mention of the Geneva agreements, even though it referred to the military campaigns in 1954 leading to the conclusion of the resistance war against the French. The editorial maintained that the balance of power "has greatly changed to the advantage of our people," and that the revolution in the South is in a "strong, offensive position" although still faced with "difficulties, complexities, and trials."

DRV MEDIA SEE GUERRILLA WARFARE AS A COUNTER TO PACIFICATION

Commentaries in the North Vietnamese press in recent months have given increased attention to the use of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam to counter GVN pacification efforts. The army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN dwelt upon this problem in an unsigned serialized article in May and in subsequent low-level articles and editorials; and NHAN DAN articles in this past week have stressed the importance of antipacification efforts. While these commentaries appear to reflect concern over GVN success in controlling the populace and may signal a new communist policy on countering pacification, comment at such a low level cannot be read as clear confirmation of such a shift. There have been few high-level discussions of the military situation in the South in Vietnamese communist media since the 1973 Paris peace agreement, and the most notable ones--two series of articles under the authoritative pseudonym "Chien Thang" (Victor), published in August and in November and December 1973--were not focused on the question of guerrilla tactics and population control.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, serialized in the paper from 21 to 25 May but only recently available in translation, provided the most detailed discussion of the role of guerrilla tactics. Observing that the "determinant of victory" in the struggle against pacification consists of building up the revolutionary forces in the hamlets, the commentary pointedly reminded its readers that "revolutionary war is an undertaking of the entire people, not just the armed forces." Characterizing the arming of the masses and expansion of guerrilla warfare as part of a "pressing requirement" needed to counter the "new strategic plan" of the United States and the GVN, the commentary asserted that the fight in the South is one to "destroy the enemy's political organizations and build up revolutionary mass organizations, a fight to shatter the enemy's armed forces and expand guerrilla forces."

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The significance of guerrilla warfare was also stressed in a 21 June commentary in the army paper which boasted of the "extremely important effectiveness" of guerrilla warfare and declared that these tactics have been developed in "many areas," especially in the Mekong Delta. According to the commentary, local forces and guerrillas, "the key forces in guerrilla warfare," have taken the initiative in launching attacks, have fought "outstandingly," and are "positively contributing to changing the balance of forces . . . in the localities and at the basic level." In this same vein, an article in the 20 July NHAN DAN claimed that the antipacification struggle in heavily populated areas controlled by the GVN was "undergoing new developments" and that guerrilla warfare activities were being accelerated.

While Vietnamese communist comment continues to routinely claim "victories" in the South and that the balance of forces has improved with the Paris agreement, some comment frankly expressed concern over the specter of pacification and stressed the need to loosen the GVN's hold on the population. In particular, the serialized QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary in May warned that since the Paris agreement the United States and Thieu have "concentrated their strength on 'pacification,'" terming it a "perfected strategy" of the Nixon doctrine. Declaring that the program is now geared at "not only annihilating the revolutionary bases in the countryside, but more importantly, at taking hold of the people, controlling them, and building a social base for the Saigon administration and army," the commentary ruefully observed that this has resulted from U.S. recognition of one of the principles of "revolutionary war": the necessity of gaining control of people, not territory. While acclaiming the "many new effective modes of struggle" devised to defeat pacification, the commentary admitted that, even with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South, Saigon still controls populated areas with a "dense suppression apparatus" and as a result can conscript, maintain a large army, and augment its other military forces. To meet this challenge, "to defeat U.S. colonial warfare," the commentary urged the use of "revolutionary war and people's warfare" in combination with the traditional political, military, and diplomatic struggle.

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AFRICA

PODGORNYY VISITS SOMALIA, SIGNS FRIENDSHIP TREATY

Moscow media have expressed considerable satisfaction with the USSR-Somalia friendship and cooperation treaty, signed at Mogadiscio by President Podgornyy and Somali Supreme Revolutionary Council President Mohamed Siad Barre during the former's 8-12 July visit. The text of the treaty has not yet been published by the two governments.* Judging by available reports on the treaty from Moscow and Mogadiscio media, it includes an expansion of the already substantial Soviet aid program in Somalia and provisions for closer ties. Moscow commentaries have characterized the treaty--the first such pact with a sub-Saharan African country--as a model for future bilateral relationships with "progressive" African countries.

PODGORNYY VISIT Podgornyy arrived in the Somali capital on 8 July, heading a six-man delegation which included USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman I.V. Arkhipov, First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov, and First Deputy Defense Minister S.L. Sokolov. His return visit represented the fulfillment of a November 1971 promise during a visit to Moscow by President Siad Barre. A high-level Soviet delegation last visited Mogadiscio in February 1972, when Defense Minister Grechko headed a mission which held talks on military aid.

Speeches by the two leaders at an 8 July banquet honoring the Soviets, as reported by PRAVDA on 10 July, stressed the close ties and kindred ideologies of the two countries since Siad took power in October 1969. Siad appeared to press for a more active Soviet role in Africa when he stated that "we acknowledge" Moscow gives "selfless assistance" to the African peoples' struggles, but added "this support must be further increased." While joining Podgornyy in expressing a cautiously optimistic view of the new Portuguese Government, he went on, unlike the Soviet leader, to specifically demand that Lisbon "unconditionally liberate occupied territories and hand over power to legitimate organizations."

* Previous Soviet friendship treaties with Third World nations--with Egypt in May 1971, India in August 1971, and Iraq in April 1972--were all published during or immediately after the visits by Soviet delegations.

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TASS reported talks between the Soviet and Somali leaders on 9 July involving "a detailed exchange of views" on "Soviet-Somali cooperation." The following day Podgornyy was accompanied by Siad to the industrial port of Kismayu. Addressing a large rally there, the Soviet President took pains to point out the friendly and "no strings attached" nature of the Soviet aid program and, while not mentioning Peking directly, attacked those "preaching the notorious theory of 'wealthy' and 'poor' nations."

Moscow radio reports on the USSR-Somali friendship treaty, signed on 11 July, note that it provides for the "strengthening of Soviet-Somali relations in the fields of politics, economics, and culture," and calls for "regular political consultations" as well as broad cooperation in "industry, agriculture, irrigation, exploitation of natural resources, trade, and navigation." Moscow also reported that USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Arkhipov had concluded a protocol to a June 1961 agreement on economic and technical cooperation.

Speeches by Podgornyy and Siad at a friendship rally on the 11th hailed the treaty and the close relations between the two countries. A Mogadiscio radio report on Siad's speech quoted him as asserting that "it is high time we controlled the destiny of our country, tied it to those who are friendly, and moved away from our enemies." A longer account of his remarks, published in PRAVDA on the 13th, omitted this passage but indicated that Siad had criticized domestic "reactionaries" who held the view that "the USSR supplies us with nothing that our people directly need," and that he had noted that closer ties with Moscow were "not to the liking of our enemies abroad, who will allege that Somalia is being led along by others."

A joint communique on the visit, released before Podgornyy's departure on the 12th, lauded the friendship treaty as a manifestation of strengthened Soviet-Somali relations and--presumably to reassure Somalia's neighbors--vowed that it was not "directed against any third countries." It acknowledged the two sides' different points of view in noting that they had had a "frank and detailed exchange of opinion," but said that the negotiations proceeded in an atmosphere of "friendship, cordiality, and mutual understanding"--a somewhat warmer formulation than used in the November 1971 communique on Siad's visit to Moscow. Claiming a "broad identity" of views on "a number of topical international issues," the communique listed agreed stands on several questions, including a call for Portugal to "take into account" the views of the leaders of liberation movements in African territories under its rule and to grant these areas independence and self-determination.

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SOVIET COMMENT The unexplained failure to release the text of the friendship treaty did not prevent Soviet media from depicting it in glowing terms. Soviet radio commentaries beamed to Africa on 13 July hailed the treaty as a model for Soviet relations with other African states and stressed that it was not aimed at other countries and would be a major factor in bringing stability to the situation in East Africa. A PRAVDA article on 14 July underscored Moscow's desire for closer ties with African countries friendly to the Soviet Union. It cited the treaty with Somalia as "fresh evidence" that "the community of basic interests of the USSR and the countries that have taken the road of independence constitutes a good basis for their alliance."

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CHINA

PEKING NOTES ANNIVERSARY OF CHIANG CHING CULTURAL TALK

Major articles this month by two of the PRC's most prominent cultural commentators in the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius--Chu Lan and Chiang Tien--have commemorated the 10th anniversary of Chiang Ching's July 1964 talk on contemporary Peking theatrical works.* According to Chu that talk was a "declaration of war" which "first started" the revolution in Peking opera, ballet, and symphonic music. Both articles stress the formal structure of revolutionary theatrical works and the struggle to maintain both artistic standards and revolutionary themes, but Chu places more stress on the struggle as a current and continuing problem. A third article marking the anniversary, written by the "writers group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities," appeared in the 16 July PEOPLE'S DAILY but the text is not yet available.

Like most other articles in the July RED FLAG, the Chu Lan article--broadcast by Peking on 12 July--noted the important role played by the party. Stressing the importance of cultural leaders rather than the masses, Chu claimed that the struggle over revolutionary literature and art has provided communist party members with an opportunity to show their "revolutionary courage" and specified that "the Marxists" led the struggle in the political and artistic fields. Making a strong defense of Chiang Ching's leadership, Chu noted that the proletarian "literary and art contingent" trained in the course of the past 10 years' struggle, "the pioneering stage," is the best qualified to continue leading the revolution in literature and art.

Chiang Tien's article, which appeared in the 12 July PEOPLE'S DAILY, concentrates almost exclusively on the need to portray proletarian heroes, beginning with a quote from Chiang Ching's 1964

* The only previous extensive media publicity for the talk came in 1967, when the talk appeared in RED FLAG No. 6, released on 8 May, and was also published in PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY on 10 May. A RED FLAG editorial hailed the talk as an "important document in the use of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought."

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talk that states: "It is necessary to mold the images of revolutionary heroes of the time on our stage. This is a task of prime importance." The article reiterates standard arguments favoring emphasis on proletarian heroes and details methods for doing so. While noting that the literary and art revolution must be carried through, Chiang Tien stresses the past struggle against Lin Piao's literary and art efforts, not echoing Chu Lan's focus on the current struggle.

BACKGROUND In 1964 when Chiang gave her talk she was just beginning her role as a cultural leader, apparently having been encouraged by Mao to do so after a serious illness. While some of her concepts have become more sharply defined since then, the summary she gave then of the correct method for creating model theatrical works still seems a valid presentation of her views. Chiang stated that plays must be created through an alliance of the leadership, professional playwrights, and the masses, with the leadership setting the theme and guiding the effort. Chiang stated that some traditional plays might be staged if suitably rewritten, but emphasized the creation of new works designed "to extol positive characters" in a revolutionary setting.

Shortly after the fall of Lin Piao and the beginning of the propaganda barrage against the idea of "genius," Chiang's accent upon the role of proletarian heroes seemed to run into some opposition. A RED FLAG article in November 1971 by Chung An, who contributed several articles to RED FLAG on cultural themes beginning in 1970, criticized a film which stressed the role of a major character who "almost became the personification of the party and the masses." Chung accused the film of rejecting the role of the party and of relegating the masses to only minor roles. Chung dropped out of sight after a final article in the May 1972 RED FLAG, and since that time there have been no direct challenges in the media to Chiang's emphasis on proletarian heroes.

PROVINCIAL TREATMENT The only provincial mention of Chiang Ching monitored thus far this month was a Wuhan radio report on a provincial forum on the reform of local opera. The broadcast called the model operas "personally nurtured" by Chiang Ching a brilliant example and ordered local troupes to "first of all" adapt the models to local forms. The report did not specifically refer to her 1964 instructions, nor did it follow the spirit of those instructions to focus attention on the creation of new works.

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PARTY AUTHORITY STRENGTHENED TO SAFEGUARD ECONOMIC PRODUCTION

Peking's apparent recent decision to tighten the reins on the campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius seems to be motivated in part by a firm resolve to prevent any further dislocations in China's economic base. Though Peking has claimed a "good" summer harvest as well as higher levels of industrial output for many areas throughout the country, several recent provincial broadcasts have revealed local production problems due to insufficient party leadership over the mass activities spurred by the campaign. Peking is taking active measures, including issuance of a Central Committee directive, to insure that the criticism campaign stimulates--not interrupts--production.

In an apparent attempt to help party committees regain control by dampening mass criticism of party leaders, an 8 July PEOPLE'S DAILY article spelled out what was not meant by the call to "go against the tide" in criticizing Lin and Confucius--a slogan introduced one year ago and endorsed at the party congress last August. The article drew a sharp line of distinction between the "correct tide" and the "incorrect tide" and declared that it was wrong to say that "as long as we rebel against the leadership we are going against the tide." Detailed class analysis under the party's tutelage was stressed as the means to detect a true "incorrect tide."

The extent of Peking's concern over the dislocations caused by the campaign was revealed by a TACHUNG DAILY editorial, broadcast by Shantung provincial radio on 14 July, which stated that the Central Committee has issued an "extremely important instruction" setting increased industrial and agricultural production as a "new requirement" of the criticism drive. The directive has not yet been acknowledged in central media. The new Central Committee directive was described as a "mighty weapon" that will strengthen party leadership over production and help fulfill state production plans while criticizing Lin and Confucius. Indicating that local production problems do exist in Shantung, the broadcast made an unusual call to struggle against the "evil wind of economism" the practice of using wage increases and other material benefits to divert the workers' attention from the struggle. Such calls were routinely issued during the cultural revolution, but have been extremely rare during the current campaign. Party members are to mobilize the masses to refute "all erroneous speeches impairing efforts to grasp revolution and promote production."

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Kiangsu appears to have been especially hard hit with production problems resulting from weak party leadership over the masses. A 15 July Nanking broadcast of a HSINHUA DAILY editorial frankly warned local party leaders that it was "dangerous" to be too deeply engrossed in the movement to criticize Lin and Confucius and fail to "exercise effective leadership over production." The broadcast revealed that there were weak links in production in some areas and announced what appears to be a no-growth period for Kiangsu's total industrial output for the first half of 1974. Industrial output for the first six months in Kiangsu was described as "about the same" as that of the same period last year.*

Kiangsu's production problems were also exposed in a 14 July Nanking broadcast on coal production which played down the masses' role in the campaign by calling on party members to carry out "ideological struggles . . . inside the party committees." Party leaders are to settle "any difference of opinion . . . in meetings so as to achieve unity of the squad." Party committees were told to exercise leadership over the masses and see that they stay at their work posts and make revolution in their spare time.

Several other provinces have also revealed local production difficulties associated with leadership mistakes in the present campaign. Harbin radio on 14 July warned that "it is wrong" for leading comrades to set the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius "against production . . . or to relax their efforts in exercising leadership over production." Problems with keeping workers at their production posts were reflected in a 14 July Nanchang broadcast which stressed the need to "persist in the eight-hour workday system." And a pointed 22 July Chengtu broadcast of a SZECHWAN DAILY editorial contained the implicit suggestion that the criticism campaign may turn against those leaders who fail to lead the masses to increase production. Noting that there were problems and weak links in production in some areas of Szechwan, the editorial boldly proclaimed that "all those who do not attach importance to looking into production are not good leaders."

MANY PROVINCES NOTE USE OF REVISED ENTRANCE EXAMINATIONS

Despite current emphasis on the role of politics in education--a continuation of last summer's nationwide movement to stress cultural revolution educational reforms in enrolling new college students--a modified entrance examination is now being used to aid colleges in selecting students who have sufficient substantive knowledge as well

* Nanking radio on 30 April had claimed that first quarter industrial production had increased by 8.6 per cent, indicating a precipitous second quarter drop.

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as the proper political credentials. The uniformity of the new guidelines, contained in a flurry of recent provincial radio reports, suggests that a Central Committee directive has been issued to explain the function of the examinations in the student enrollment process. The new guidelines on enrollment examinations shed light on an issue which has remained sensitive since a Liaoning youth sparked a successful campaign one year ago to prevent a return to the old form of examination based on rote memorization of middle school texts. The return of a reformed examination system serves to illustrate Peking's basic interest in achieving the Maoist goal of "red and expert" graduates by striking a balance between political and professional training in the schools.

Like last year, the general procedure for admission to higher education still consists of voluntary application, recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership, and reexamination by the colleges concerned. This year's enrollment announcements, however, place heavy stress on the need for enrollment officials to make an "overall evaluation" of the applicant's "moral, intellectual, and physical achievements." The announcements repeat the stock injunction that political criteria must receive primary emphasis in judging applicants. All applicants for higher education must demonstrate a cultural level at or above that of a junior middle school graduate and have at least two years of practical experience.

The specific role of the "necessary cultural tests" in the enrollment process was well illustrated in a 19 July Nanking report on student enrollment work throughout Kiangsu. The broadcast stressed that student selection criteria must be based on an "all-inclusive evaluation of their moral, intellectual and physical qualities," with first consideration given to their "political merits." Every applicant must, however, be given an examination measuring his ability to "analyse and solve problems." The examinations must use the methods of "investigation, interview, forum, and discussion" and must reflect "the particular requirements of the professional course concerned." The names of all applicants who pass the examination are to be made public to insure that the masses have actually been consulted in the selection of students. The applicant must then report to the "school screening board" for final reexamination by the schools. Thus far, similar reports on the use of examinations in local enrollment work have also been received from Liaoning, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Heilungkiang, Kansu, and Chekiang.

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A 19 July Liaoning broadcast reporting on the use of cultural examinations in its local enrollment drive was accompanied by a separate report by Chang Tieh-sheng, the student who received national fame for triggering last summer's attack on the old examination system. Chang, now a student at the Liaoning Agricultural College, revealed that he has devoted part of his time in school to seeking further educational reforms. Most of his time apparently has gone into study, as the broadcast carefully noted that Chang usually spends "Sundays" leading investigations to gain information on needed reforms at the school. Chang urged continued vigilance against those who still seek to use entrance examinations to give priority to "intellectual education and high marks."

A proper balance between "red and expert"--which the guidelines on student enrollment in force this summer would seem to foster--apparently has already been achieved at Shanghai's Futan University. A glowing 22 July Shanghai report on Futan's efforts to train workers in the field of foreign affairs revealed that the 80 students who enrolled in special foreign affairs training classes that opened at the university in September 1972 have achieved "encouraging results" in both "ideology and vocation." While at school, these students took part in every political movement and also worked hard to study political theory, international relations and foreign languages. Recent graduates of the special foreign affairs training program were characterized as "eager to go to their respective posts in the field of foreign affairs."

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USSR

DEFIANT PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL CONTINUES CAMPAIGN FOR NEW IDEAS

The campaign to promote new, unorthodox ideas conducted by QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY chief editor I.T. Frolov is continuing despite strenuous efforts by neo-Stalinist Central Committee science supervisor S.P. Trapeznikov to reinforce ideological controls. Even though a commission of the Institute of Philosophy was set up to investigate Frolov's management of the journal, in a January editorial he boldly defended his journal's right to pursue objective truth and warned against heavy handed attacks by conservatives.* When the commission reported in early February, it basically sided with Frolov. Shortly thereafter Frolov's mentor, B.M. Kedrov, resigned as director of the Institute of Philosophy, but Frolov continued (as of mid-June) to hold his post as chief editor and to press ahead with the publication of controversial material.**

An account of the commission's discussion of Frolov's work published in the June issue of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY illustrates both the support he enjoys among philosophers and natural scientists and the enmity he has earned in the Central Committee's science section. Apparently in response to the complaints of the science section's head, Trapeznikov, the institute appointed a commission to study the journal's work and the institute's scholarly council took the unusual step of calling in the editor for a report. The commission's report, announced at a 5 February session of the council, largely vindicated Frolov's leadership, a result which was warmly supported by the speakers at the session.

Institute of Philosophy deputy director F.T. Arkhiptsev presented the commission's report, lauding the successes of the journal and praising its editorials and roundtable discussions. His criticisms were mild and his proposed correctives were minor (closer contact between the institute and its journal, and periodic discussion of provocative articles). But Arkhiptsev did drop hints about where the pressure against Frolov was coming from. He noted that problems pointed out in

* See the Supplementary Article in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences."

** For details on Kedrov's resignation, see the TRENDS of 3 July 1974, pages 12-16.

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Trapeznikov's August 1973 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article had not been resolved, and he termed understandable the "alarm" over the journal's treatment of dialectical materialism which was felt "throughout 1973 both in the CPSU Central Committee section for science and educational institutions and by leaders of our philosophical science in the USSR Academy of Sciences."

The pro-Frolov tone of the meeting was set by the opening remarks of Kedrov, who apparently was still director of the institute, although he was not so identified in the account. While calling for frank criticism of the journal's shortcomings, he added that in criticizing the journal, phrases should not be taken out of context and we should "also criticize ourselves since we are also authors and co-workers of the journal." Frolov spoke, repeating many of the ideas in his January editorial and asserting that at least a third of the journal should be devoted to debate and arguments. Other speakers, such as philosopher S.M. Kovalev and biologist N.P. Dubinin, declared that since all participants in the discussion were loyal communists, the "victims of the debate" should be "not people, but bad ideas." Kovalev sympathetically concluded that while the journal's editors "at first had taken criticism somewhat irritably, later the comrades understood that these shortcomings must be eliminated, and I am sure that these shortcomings will be eliminated by the journal's editorial collegium and editorial board." Dubinin stressed that Frolov's efforts to attract natural scientists into philosophical discussions were highly successful, and other speakers also indicated that Frolov had developed a strong constituency among natural scientists as well as philosophers.

Frolov's continuing determination to stimulate debate has been clear in the most recent issues of his journal, which have devoted considerable space to roundtable discussions and articles on controversial topical subjects. In the April issue he began a discussion on the social implications of the scientific-technical revolution and enlisted Kosygin's son-in-law, D.M. Gvishiani, to write the opening article. Gvishiani stressed the increasing role of philosophers, sociologists and economists in developing a theory of the scientific-technical revolution to help decide concrete political, economic and ideological problems, and wrote that the growing importance of science "widens its social functions" and speeds "penetration of innovations into all spheres of public life." The May issue continued this discussion, took up problems of international relations, and began a roundtable on the quality of philosophical writings. The June issue continued these topics, as well as carrying the first part of the stenographic record of the 5 February discussion of the journal's work.

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UKRAINIAN LEADERSHIP REBUKED FOR NEGLECT OF CONSUMER GOODS OUTPUT

In a new move in the high-level maneuvering over economic policy which has characterized Soviet politics since the December 1973 CPSU plenum, PRAVDA on 14 July published a CPSU Central Committee decree criticizing the Ukrainian party and government leadership for neglect of consumer goods production. Amounting in effect to a rebuke of Brezhnev's protege V. V. Shcherbitskiy, Ukrainian first secretary and Politburo member, the decree points to a sharpening of the leadership rivalries over economic policy. Although Brezhnev has identified himself with increased consumer goods production since at least 1971, Kosygin has done so over a longer period of time and has, moreover, apparently taken the lead in the post-plenum drive to increase the production and upgrade the quality of consumer goods. Whereas previous decrees on consumer goods have been aimed at Kosygin's central ministries, this one shifts the brunt of criticism to a republic organization closely associated with Brezhnev.

PRELIMINARY EXPOSE The current attack on Ukrainian handling of consumer goods apparently stems from an investigation conducted by IZVESTIYA in March and April. An IZVESTIYA team visited several Ukrainian cities and in a series of articles on 24 and 29 March, and 2, 5 and 6 April exposed what were described as massive shortcomings. After the tour the team talked with Ukrainian Light Industry Minister O. Ya. Kasyanenko about the shortcomings, and finding the minister's answers and actions unsatisfactory, published a devastating attack on him in the 4 June IZVESTIYA. He was accused of resisting the introduction of production associations in his ministry, of creating "artificial" associations, of failing to organize socialist competition, of taking a whole month to respond to the IZVESTIYA exposures, and of doing virtually nothing to correct the situation. The article noted that in the first quarter of 1974 54 of his ministry's enterprises--more than last year--were failing to fulfill the plan and that by the end of April this number had risen to 75.

Shcherbitskiy reacted quickly, calling a meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee Secretariat which adopted a decree admitting the correctness of IZVESTIYA's articles and criticizing Kasyanenko's poor work. Shcherbitskiy's response was reported in the 11 June IZVESTIYA. Shcherbitskiy himself, while chairman of the Council of Ministers, had promoted Kasyanenko to minister of light industry in May 1972, just days before succeeding Shelest as republic first secretary.

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CENTRAL MINISTRIES
REBUKED

Over the past few years, decrees on consumer goods production have been aimed at Kosygin's own ministries in Moscow. A 15 September 1971 Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree, for example, published in the 29 October 1971 PRAVDA, called for sharp boosts in consumer goods output, allotted additional investments to this end, and adopted tough measures to force ministries--both in light and heavy industry sectors--to increase consumer goods production.* An article in the October 1972 PLANNED ECONOMY made it clear that the September 1971 decree had been prompted by a failure of the ministries to cooperate sufficiently with the government's expressed wishes. Another Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree published in the 9 December 1972 IZVESTIYA pointed to the need for increased production of equipment for the light and food industries, and ordered the appropriate ministers to meet this need. On 28 August 1973 PRAVDA published a Central Committee decree which, noting that 2.3 billion rubles had been invested in light industry in the last two years, censured the light industry ministry for various shortcomings and rebuked minister N. N. Tarasov--a close associate of Kosygin since the late 1940's--for "unsatisfactory work."

The consumer goods situation obviously became a subject of increased attention in late 1973. In his 13 November 1973 Minsk speech Kosygin stressed the need for speeding the development of the light and food industries in the 1974 plan. According to subsequent statements, the December plenum discussed the question of increasing the production and upgrading the quality of consumer goods, while the implication of Brezhnev's 14 June 1974 Supreme Soviet election speech was that the discussion had concentrated on unused reserves in the light and food industries.

Following the plenum the Central Committee took two actions to improve light industrial production. On 6 April 1974 PRAVDA announced that the Central Committee had approved an initiative by several collectives for a socialist competition on the use of production capacity and quality of goods. This decree received considerable fanfare in subsequent newspaper editorials, which cited "huge" unused reserves in light industry and criticized the light industry ministry for setting low targets for some enterprises. On 22 April Kosygin won Central Committee approval of a decree to loosen controls in light industry, allowing consumer goods production to be adjusted on the basis of orders from retail outlets.** Unlike the socialist competition decree, however, this decree received little publicity.

* See the TRENDS of 26 October 1972, pages 30-31.

** See the TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 19-24.

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"TWO PILLARS" These two actions appeared to represent the differing emphases adopted by Brezhnev and Kosygin toward the problem of boosting production, the former appearing more enthusiastic about hortatory campaigns and moral incentives and the latter favoring changes in management and planning methods to activate the economic "levers." Indeed, Brezhnev himself in his December plenum speech announced that the party's economic policy was based on "two pillars"--improvement of management and mobilization of the masses. Brezhnev's elaboration on the first approach has not been published, but his extensive and enthusiastic comments on socialist competition were carried in the excerpts from his December plenum speech printed in a collection of his speeches on agriculture. A socialist competition for prefulfillment of the 1974 plan was announced shortly after the plenum, on 12 January, followed by Kosygin's "direct ties" decree on 22 April.

A similar dichotomy had appeared at the December 1972 plenum, which also discussed changes in economic planning and administration. A socialist competition to prefulfill the 1973 plan was announced on 6 January 1973, followed by a 2 March 1973 Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree ordering reorganization of ministries on a two or three tier structure based on production associations. Kosygin in his 13 November 1973 Minsk speech revealed that it had been Brezhnev who had proposed the socialist competition during discussion of the 1973 plan in late 1972. The decree on production associations, on the other hand, appeared to reflect Kosygin's influence, extending cost accounting and facilitating more effective use of the managerial autonomy granted by the 1965 economic reform.

PAST UKRAINIAN
PERFORMANCE

Although most Ukrainian leaders--including former First Secretary Shelest and present First Secretary Shcherbitskiy--had made their careers in heavy industry, they had appeared to swing behind the consumer goods program adopted at the April 1971 24th CPSU Congress, taking measures to promote consumer goods production, both in light industry and heavy industry, and harshly attacking some officials for noncooperation. A May 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee decree approved an initiative by heavy industrial plant collectives to increase consumer goods production, and at a June 1971 Ukrainian plenum the then First Secretary Shelest praised this initiative and also revealed that the Ukrainian Politburo had recently "severely criticized" leaders of prominent Kharkov plants for trying to avoid producing consumer goods at their plants. A special Ukrainian Central Committee plenum was held in September 1971 to hear Premier Shcherbitskiy report on increasing consumer goods output as well as upgrading the quality of the product. A number of

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machine building plants were assailed at the plenum for not producing consumer goods, and measures were adopted to improve consumer goods output. Shcherbitskiy again criticized the resisting heavy industrial plants in a November 1971 USSR Supreme Soviet speech.

In April 1972 the attacks on noncooperation in Kharkov plants apparently served as a pretext to oust the senior Kharkovite in the leadership, N. A. Sobol, who also happened to be first deputy premier in charge of industry. Further attacks followed in June 1972, when a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium decree criticized the work of the Kharkov soviet in supervising consumer goods production and in July, when a Kharkov leader had to admit shortcomings in his oblast's consumer goods production at a session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's commission on heavy industry. The Kharkov party organization was subsequently censured for generally poor leadership of industry by a CPSU Central Committee decree published in an October 1973 PARTY LIFE.

But despite the strong push in 1971-72, heavy industry-oriented Ukrainian officials have been slow to adapt to the stress on consumer goods production. In a May 1973 article in UNDER THE BANNER OF LENINISM, Ukrainian Light Industry Secretary Ya. Pogrebnyak acknowledged failings by light industry enterprises and footdragging in machine building and ferrous metallurgy plants, especially those in Dnepropetrovsk. Sobol's replacement as first deputy premier in charge of industry, G. I. Vashchenko, reported to a June 1973 Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session that the republic's industries still suffered from many shortcomings in consumer goods production. At the December 1973 USSR Supreme Soviet session, Pogrebnyak declared that consumer goods production would not reach the level set in the five-year plan. At a 26 April session of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, reported in the 30 April RODYANSKA UKRAINA, it was stated that some branches were not fully using their reserves for increasing output, especially output of consumer goods, and improving their quality and assortment.

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NOTE

FRG-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY: Czechoslovak and Soviet media have stressed that the 19 July exchange of documents ratifying the treaty normalizing Bonn-Prague relations has finally drawn a line under the postwar normalization of relations between Bonn and the socialist countries of East Europe. Comment points out that this process was implemented through the complex of treaties signed by the FRG under Brandt's Ostpolitik beginning with the 1970 Moscow treaty. Regarding the contentious issue of the interpretation of the validity of the 1938 Munich Agreement, Prague has continued to take great pains to place its own interpretation on the treaty's language: i.e., that the FRG allegedly has recognized the Munich Agreement as invalid from the beginning. CSSR Foreign Minister Chnoupek, speaking on the 15th at the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly session which ratified the treaty, made this point abundantly clear. Prague media have been careful not to report FRG Foreign Minister Genscher's 19 July remarks in Bonn that it was not possible for the two countries to eliminate all differences over legal interpretations resulting from the Munich Agreement, but that he was hopeful these questions were settled "for the future." Chnoupek on the 19th did acknowledge, however, that the treaty was a "compromise." Both Prague and Moscow have come down hard on the nearly total CDU/CSU opposition to the treaty in the Bundestag ratification process.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 JULY 1974

| <u>Moscow (2723 items)</u> | | <u>Peking (878 items)</u> | |
|---|----------|---------------------------------------|-----------|
| Cyprus Crisis | (--) 17% | Niger Delegation in PRC | (--) 12% |
| [Soviet Government, TASS Statements | (--) 8%] | [PRC-Niger Diplomatic Relations | (--) 3%] |
| Polish Liberation 30th Anniversary | (1%) 16% | Law of the Sea Conference | (21%) 10% |
| [Brezhnev Speeches in Poland | (--) 5%] | Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius | (9%) 9% |
| Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 Mission | (4%) 6% | Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes in PRC | (--) 5% |
| China | (6%) 5% | Cyprus Crisis | (--) 3% |
| Nixon USSR Visit | (10%) 2% | Sikkim | (2%) 3% |
| South Yemen Party-Government Delegation in USSR | (--) 2% | USSR | (1%) 3% |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.